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LIES BEHIND BARS:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMATIC 
RELIANCE ON JAILHOUSE INFORMANT 
TESTIMONY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM AND A TEXAS-SIZED ATTEMPT TO 
ADDRESS THE ISSUE 
INTRODUCTION 
The advent of DNA technology in the late 1980s led to a wave of 
exonerations in the United States, shedding light on major problems with 
the U.S. criminal justice system.1 Many of these wrongful convictions were 
traced back to criminal informants, colloquially referred to as “snitches,” 
who provided incriminating testimony in exchange for a sentence reduction, 
leniency, inmate privileges, or some other perk. 2  Notably, criminal 
informants are the leading cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases, 
accounting for 45.9% of death row exonerations.3 The correlation between 
wrongful convictions and informant testimony is a cause for concern, 
especially in Texas, where more people have been executed and exonerated 
than anywhere else in the country.4 This Note analyzes the use of criminal 
informants with a particular focus on jailhouse informants—inmates that 
come forward with the “confessions” of fellow inmates.5 First, this Note 
discusses the broad use of criminal informants throughout history and the 
 
1. See DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocencepr 
oject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/9YP6-FH2K]. Since the first DNA 
exoneration in 1989, over 2000 wrongful convictions in the United States have been overturned. NAT’L 
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx [https:/ 
/perma.cc/FY5L-NGH3]. 
2. NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, supra note 1; INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 1. See 
Alexandra Natapoff, The Shadowy World of Jailhouse Informants: Explained, THE APPEAL (July 11, 
2018), https://theappeal.org/the-shadowy-world-of-jailhouse-informants-an-explainer/ [https://perma.cc 
/2UJ5-BS42] [hereinafter Natapoff, The Shadowy World]. 
3. NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH 
SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH 
ROW 3 (2004), https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SnitchSystemBooklet.p 
df [https://perma.cc/6H64-4EL9]. 
4. Exonerations by State, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/specia 
l/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2019); 
Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/e 
xecutions/executions-overview/number-of-executions-by-state-and-region-since-1976 [https://perma.c 
c/2CAV-3FNV]. In fact, Texas accounts for over one-third of the total executions that have taken place 
in the United States. Id. 
5. “A jailhouse informant is an inmate, usually awaiting trial or sentencing, who claims to have 
heard another prisoner make an admission about his case.” Jana Winograde, Jailhouse Informants and 
the Need for Judicial Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 755 (1990). 












problems that have arisen therefrom.6 Second, it examines Nolley v. State,7 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case that inspired legislative change 
in Texas.8 Third, this Note assesses Texas House Bill 34,9 which is Texas’s 
latest legislative effort to regulate the use of jailhouse informants and has 
been referred to as “the most comprehensive effort yet to rein in the dangers 
of transactional snitching.” 10  Finally, this Note proposes a solution to 
address the problem of unreliable jailhouse informant testimony that 
requires judges to serve a “gatekeeping role” through which they could filter 
out unreliable testimony before trial.11 As part of this solution, this Note 
recommends giving judges and defense attorneys access to a statewide 
database containing information on every jailhouse informant ever used so 
that they do not have to rely on the prosecution to produce that information. 
Though this solution will add to the workload of judges, it is necessary to 
prevent prosecutorial misconduct and ensure the integrity of the U.S. 
criminal justice system.  
I. INFORMANT USE THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
The criminal informant system dates back to 18th century Great 
Britain.12 In old England, Parliament offered monetary rewards in exchange 
for incriminating information.13 This “blood money” cultivated lies and fear 
within the society and created a “cycle of betrayal,” where snitches sold out 
other people only to be later sold out themselves. 14  This reality is 
exemplified by the case of Charles Cane, who “provided evidence that sent 
two men to their deaths in 1755. A few months later, a snitch did unto him 
as he had done unto others. . . . Cane was hanged at Tyburn in 1756 . . . .”15  
 
6. See infra Part I.  
7. Nolley v. State, No. 02-98-00253-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 23, 1999), aff’d sub 
nom. Ex parte Nolley, No. WR-46,177-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2001), vacated sub nom. Ex parte 
Nolley, No. WR-46,177-03, 2018 WL 2126318 (Tex. Crim. App. May 9, 2018). 
8. See infra Part II.  
9. H.B. 34, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). 
10. See infra Part III. Editorial, Texas Cracks Down on the Market for Jailhouse Snitches, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/opiniont/sunday/texas-cracks-down-on-th 
e-market-for-jailhouse-snitches.html [https://perma.cc/65HX-47GA]. Innocence Project legislative 
strategist Michelle Feldman recognizes Texas as “the gold standard in innocence reform.” Jolie 
McCullough & Justin Dehn, How Some See Texas as the “Gold Standard” Against Wrongful 
Convictions, TEX. TR. (Sept. 20, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/09/20/texas-law 
makers-hope-prevent-wrongful-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/2JP9-UFU7]. 
11. See infra Part IV. The solution set forth herein is applicable not only in Texas but in all states. 
12. NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 2. 
















The criminal informant system likely came to the New World aboard the 
Mayflower.16 In fact, the first known wrongful conviction in the United 
States—the 1819 conviction of Jesse Boorn in Manchester, Vermont—can 
be traced back to a jailhouse informant.17 The informant, Silas Merrill, 
shared a jail cell with Jessee Boorn and would later testify that Jessee 
confessed to a murder.18 Luckily, Boorn was saved from the noose when the 
“murder victim” turned up alive in New Jersey.19  
Though the “blood money” of the 1700s has been replaced by sentencing 
leniency and other perks that are more hidden from the public eye, the 
informant system remains prevalent in modern America.20 Every year, the 
government offers thousands of informants lighter sentences or leniency in 
exchange for incriminating testimony.21 The U.S. Sentencing Commission 
reports that defendants across all categories of federal offenses receive 
sentence reductions for cooperation with police and prosecutors. 22 
Additionally, the Commission reports that at least half of all defendants 
facing federal drug charges cooperate with agents in some way.23 While this 
federal data points to widespread informant use, criminology studies at the 
state and local levels indicate that informant use is even more prevalent than 
federal data suggests.24  
Perhaps the most glaring statistics that evidence informant use in modern 
America are those that relate to exonerations. Criminal informants are the 
leading cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases, playing a role in 
about fifty percent of death row exonerations. 25  Furthermore, jailhouse 






20. Alexandra Natapoff, Secret Justice: Criminal Informants and America’s Underground Legal 
System, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (June 15, 2010), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2010/jun/15/secr 
et-justice-criminal-informants-and-americas-underground-legal-system/ [https://perma.cc/8N6Z-MEC 
Y] [hereinafter Natapoff, Secret Justice]. 
21. Id. According to scholar Alexandra Natapoff, “[t]he practice of trading information for guilt 
is so pervasive that it has literally become a thriving business.” Natapoff describes a “for-profit snitch 
ring” at a federal prison where “prisoners were buying and selling information about pending cases to 
offer to prosecutors in order to reduce their own sentences.” Id. 
22. Id.  
23. This cooperation could include coming forward with incriminating information or making a 
controlled purchase. See id. A “controlled purchase” is defined as “[t]he purchase of contraband by an 
undercover officer or an informant for the purpose of setting up an arrest of the seller.” Controlled 
Purchase, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
24. Natapoff, Secret Justice, supra note 20. 
25. NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 3. 
See also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543–44 (2005).  












exonerations.26 Though the data on informant use is somewhat limited,27 
these reports and findings confirm that the informant system remains a 
pervasive reality.28  
A. An Incentive-Fueled System 
The informant system is fueled and perpetuated by incentives. On one 
side of the table, prosecutors and law enforcement officials face immense 
pressure to secure convictions. Informants provide them with a relatively 
simple way to solve complicated crimes. One scholar explains that “[i]n 
some instances, such as white-collar or gang crime, criminal activity is so 
secretive, complex, or hard to detect, or involves such ever-present threats 
of violence against co-conspirators straying from the criminal fold, that 
prosecution is impracticable without informants.”29 Another writes: 
There is a cold brutality and inherent risk of unreliability in the way 
we use the threat of vastly greater prison time to squeeze information 
out of culpable defendants. But no equally effective tool for prying 
closely held information about corrupt dealings or other, less genteel 
forms of organized crime, has been devised.30  
Prosecutors have wide discretion and many resources at their disposal when 
it comes to dealing with informants.31 They can drop charges, refrain from 
arresting someone, or recommend a lower sentence in exchange for 
information.32 In sum, informant bargaining serves as an invaluable tool in 
the prosecutor’s briefcase—one that is used in thousands of cases every 
year.33 
On the opposite side of the table, becoming an informant serves as an 
appealing alternative to facing mandatory minimums, overcrowded prisons, 
 
26. Informing Injustice: The Disturbing Use of Jailhouse Informants, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/informing-injustice/ [https://perma.cc/774X-8U8Z] [hereinafter 
Informing Injustice]. 
27. Data on informant use is limited due to the fact that most state and local governments do not 
keep track of informant use. Natapoff, Secret Justice, supra note 20. 
28. As stated by the Tenth Circuit, “[t]his ingrained practice of granting lenience in exchange for 
testimony has created a vested sovereign prerogative in the government.” United States v. Singleton, 165 
F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999). 
29. Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1080 
(2011). Natapoff notes that “[t]he FBI’s use of mafia informants—some of them murderers—helped 
dismantle organized crime.” Natapoff, The Shadowy World, supra note 2. 
30. Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 
76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67–68 (2013). 
31. Natapoff, The Shadowy World, supra note 2. 
32. Id. Notably, officials have been known to lie, break rules, and even commit crimes to reward 
or protect their criminal informants. Id. 













and serious criminal charges. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allow for a 
departure from a mandatory minimum sentence when an offender has 
offered “substantial assistance” in investigating or prosecuting another 
wrongdoer. 34  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 allows for the 
reduction of a sentence if a defendant provides “substantial assistance” after 
having already received the sentence.35 While the most common benefit 
informants receive is sentencing leniency, other possible benefits include 
improved conditions of confinement, drugs, money, and even legal 
immigration status for family members or themselves. 36  These strong 
incentives on both sides of the table ultimately work together to perpetuate 
the informant system. 
B. Jailhouse Informants 
Jailhouse informants merit special consideration, as they are notoriously 
unreliable.37 Indeed, since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the use of jailhouse 
informants constitutional in 1966, over 140 people have been exonerated in 
murder cases that involved jailhouse informant testimony.38 Because they 
are already behind bars, jailhouse informants have a greater incentive to lie 
and are highly motivated to cooperate with law enforcement officials.39 As 
one researcher puts it, “they have so little to lose and so much to gain . . . 
 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2018); Taslitz, supra note 29, at 1078–79. Whether a mandatory 
minimum applies or not, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines permit the court to depart downward from the 
sentence specified by the guidelines only upon a motion by the government stating that the defendant 
has substantially assisted the investigation or prosecution of another person. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2018). Although the Supreme Court made the guidelines advisory rather 
than mandatory through a series of decisions, courts still give them substantial weight. Taslitz, supra 
note 29, at 1079. 
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35; Taslitz, supra note 29, at 1079. Taslitz notes that “[t]his provision 
incentivizes jailhouse snitches to lie even after their conviction.” Id. 
36. Natapoff, The Shadowy World, supra note 2. 
37. See Taslitz, supra note 29, at 1077. Ellen Reasonover, who served seventeen years before 
being exonerated, stated, “I lost my child, my freedom, and nearly my life because of false jailhouse 
informant testimony.” Informing Injustice, supra note 26. Martin Reeves, who was wrongfully convicted 
and imprisoned for twenty-one years based on false jailhouse informant testimony, stated, “It was just 
way too easy for the state to use the [jailhouse informant] . . . against me . . . and then they just let him 
out.” Id. 
38. Katie Zavadski & Moiz Syed, 30 Years of Jailhouse Snitch Scandals, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 4, 
2019), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/jailhouse-informants-timeline [https://perma.cc/47EY-4 
9PK]. 
39. There are a number of immediate jail-related benefits that inmates can gain from providing 
information, such as dropped charges (release), cash that can be spent at the jail commissary, visiting 
privileges, food, cigarettes, cell assignments, and phone access. Natapoff, The Shadowy World, supra 
note 2. “In jail, it is widely understood that helping prosecutors and the police can earn extraordinary 
benefits, from reduced sentences to dismissed charges.” Pamela Colloff, How This Con Man’s Wild 
Testimony Sent Dozens to Jail, and 4 to Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.co 
m/2019/12/04/magazine/jailhouse-informant.html [https://perma.cc/3XCH-P49N]. 












.”40 Moreover, living in close quarters with other inmates awaiting trial 
makes it easier for them to fabricate testimony based on details that they 
overhear and more likely that they will be solicited for testimony from 
officials. In the words of researcher Alexandra Natapoff, they are 
“surrounded by a ready-made supply of vulnerable targets who are already 
suspected of criminal conduct.” 41  Among this “ready-made supply of 
vulnerable targets” are veteran informants who educate other inmates on 
how to convincingly fabricate information.42 They learn to craft information 
that sounds accurate by stealing other inmates’ legal papers, finding news 
reports, and colluding with others both on the inside and the outside.43 The 
ease with which a jailhouse informant can convincingly fabricate testimony 
thanks to their unique position is illustrated by the case of Leslie White: 
[White] demonstrated for the Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department that 
he could convincingly fabricate a fellow inmate’s murder confession. 
White proved that a jailhouse informant can gather enough 
information about a particular crime to testify against a defendant at 
trial without ever having met the defendant. Indeed, White and 
several other informants regularly used by the District Attorney’s 
office have admitted to giving false testimony about various 
defendants’ jailhouse confessions in order to obtain lenient treatment 
in their own cases.44  
Given that the unique position of jailhouse informants increases their 
propensity and ability to fabricate testimony, any reliance on jailhouse 
informant testimony in court is a serious cause for concern. Randy Arledge, 
who spent more than fourteen years in prison for a murder he did not commit 
thanks to the false testimony of a jailhouse informant, summed up this 
reality in simple, yet foreboding, language: “There’ll always be somebody 
in jail that will lie for you . . . . If you don’t stop the jailhouse inform[ants] 
. . . the wrongful convictions ain’t ever gonna stop.”45 
 
40. Jack Call, Judicial Control of Jailhouse Snitches, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 73, 74 (2001). 
41. Natapoff, The Shadowy World, supra note 2. 
42. Id.  
43. Id. 
44. Winograde, supra note 5, at 756 (footnotes omitted).  
45. McCullough & Dehn, supra note 10. Arledge was sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison 
for the brutal murder of a Texas woman. Maurice Possley, Randolph Arledge, NAT’L REGISTRY 
EXONERATIONS (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.asp 
x?caseid=4114 [https://perma.cc/M3C3-MSBR]. After DNA evidence linked another man to the crime, 
jailhouse informant Bennie Lamas admitted to lying at Arledge’s trial to get revenge on Arledge for 













C. Judicially-Imposed Constraints on the Use of Jailhouse Informants 
There are some judicially-imposed constraints on the use of jailhouse 
informants in criminal proceedings. In 1964, the Supreme Court held in 
Massiah v. United States that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the 
government from “deliberately elicit[ing]” information from a suspect that 
has been formally charged with a crime in the absence of counsel.46 In other 
words, the government may not strategically use a jailhouse informant to 
elicit incriminating information from a formally charged suspect.47 More 
than a decade later, the Court clarified what it means to “deliberately elicit 
information” in Brewer v. Williams. 48  The Brewer court held that a 
detective’s use of subtle, psychological pressure—e.g., suggesting to a 
mentally ill defendant that the police needed to find the murder victim’s 
body to “give her a proper Christian burial”—constituted deliberate 
elicitation and, therefore, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel.49  
The contours of the “deliberate elicitation” standard are harder to define 
in the context of jailhouse informants due to the day-to-day atmosphere, 
relations, and pressures within a given jail cell, but the Supreme Court has 
made several attempts to do so.50 In United States v. Henry, Billy Henry was 
charged in connection with a bank robbery and incarcerated in a jail in 
Virginia.51 The government contacted an informant jailed in the same cell 
block as Henry and instructed him to listen for any incriminating statements 
made by Henry but not to question Henry regarding the charges he faced.52 
The informant later provided testimony that would result in Henry’s 
conviction, stating that “he had ‘an opportunity to have some conversations 
with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail’” and that Henry described to him 
in detail the events surrounding the bank robbery.53 The court of appeals 
vacated Henry’s sentence and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 
“[b]y intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make 
 
46. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964). See also Call, supra note 40, at 75. 
47. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205–06.  
48. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399–400 (1977). 
49. Id. at 399; Matthew J. Merritt, Jailhouse Informants and the Sixth Amendment: Is the U.S. 
Supreme Court Adequately Protecting an Accused’s Right to Counsel?, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1332 
(2003).  
50. Merritt, supra note 49, at 1324–25. 
51. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 265–66 (1980). 
52. Id. at 266. 
53. Id. at 267. 












incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government 
violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”54 
The Court reconsidered the Sixth Amendment in the context of jailhouse 
informants in Kuhlmann v. Wilson.55 There, the defendant, Joseph Wilson, 
was charged with robbery and murder.56 While awaiting trial, Wilson was 
incarcerated with an inmate named Benny Lee.57 Unbeknownst to Wilson, 
Lee had previously agreed to act as an informant for authorities, who 
instructed him to simply “keep his ears open.”58 Shortly after Wilson’s 
arrival, Wilson detailed his crime to Lee, who secretly took notes on the 
conversation.59 Lee went on to testify about the conversation at trial, and 
Wilson was convicted of murder.60 Soon thereafter, Wilson sought federal 
habeas corpus relief, citing United States v. Henry and asserting that his 
statements to Lee were obtained by measures that violated his Sixth 
Amendment rights. 61  The Supreme Court held that Wilson’s Sixth 
Amendment rights had not been violated because the police and the 
informant did not take “action, beyond merely listening, that was designed 
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.”62 In other words, according to 
the Kulmann court, a jailhouse informant can be used to collect information 
from another inmate as long as the informant is passively listening and not 
initiating conversation regarding the charges an inmate faces.63  
In addition to imposing constraints on the ways that informants can 
collect information, the Constitution imposes certain trial-related 
obligations on prosecutors seeking to use informant testimony. In Brady v. 
Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”64 In the context of informants, 
 
54. Id. at 274. The Court found deliberate elicitation by looking at conduct of both the 
government and the informant. Id. 
55. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 457–59 (1986). 
56. Id. at 438–39. 
57. Id. at 439. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 439–40. 
60. Id. at 440–41. 
61. Id. at 441–43.  
62. Id. at 459. 
63. Id.; Merritt, supra note 49, at 1350–51. 
64. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Evidence is considered “material” when there is 
“a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 (1995) (quoting United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). The Supreme Court has clarified that the accused need not 
request the materially impeaching information for the Brady duty to arise. United States v. Agurs, 427 













this means that a prosecutor must turn over to the defense information that 
could be used to impeach the jailhouse informant, such as promises made 
to the informant in exchange for information or the informant’s cooperation 
with law enforcement in other cases.65 Scholars have noted that the Brady 
rule lacks sufficient teeth to influence many cases. 66  Specifically, “the 
Brady requirements allow too much risk that a prosecutor who has 
impeachment information that he or she knows the defense does not have 
will think it is unlikely that . . . the defense will ever discover the 
information on its own . . . and, therefore, will decide not to disclose it.”67 
Another shortcoming of the Brady requirement in the context of jailhouse 
informants is that deals between the prosecution and an informant are often 
implicit, rather than express, and, therefore, there is nothing for the 
prosecution to disclose at trial.68  
Given the weaknesses in the parameters identified by the Supreme Court 
for the use of jailhouse informants, state legislatures must implement 
additional restrictions.69 Texas is among a small number of states that have 
enacted jailhouse informant laws within the past three years.70 The wrongful 
conviction of John Nolley in Nolley v. State spurred legislative action in 
 
65. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972) (applying Brady and holding that 
information that could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness, such as an immunity deal offered 
to the witness in exchange for testimony, must be disclosed to the defendant where the reliability of that 
witness may be determinative of the defendant’s innocence or guilt); Call, supra note 40, at 81. Scholars 
have noted that “Brady marked a potentially revolutionary shift from traditionally unfettered adversarial 
combat toward a more inquisitorial, innocence-focused system.” Stephanos Bibas, The Story of Brady 
v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence? 1 (U of Penn Law 
School, Public Law Working Paper No. 06-08, July 29, 2005), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/vie 
wcontent.cgi?article=1076&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/TG7L-6T2A]. 
66. Call, supra note 40, at 81. “Judges are too weak, prosecutors are too partisan, enforcement is 
too difficult, discovery is too limited, and plea bargains are too widespread for Brady to influence many 
cases. Brady remains an important symbol but in some ways a hollow one.” Bibas, supra note 65, at 21. 
67. Call, supra note 40, at 81. “[T]o establish a Brady v. Maryland claim, the defendant must 
initially show that the government possessed material favorable to the defense that the government did 
not disclose.” United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009). 
68. NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 
15. “Even absent a formal understanding, the reward inevitably comes—because failing to deliver in one 
case would chill prospective future snitches.” Id. 
69. Natapoff notes that state law “imposes almost no restraints on police and prosecutorial 
authority to create and reward informants.” Natapoff, Secret Justice, supra note 20. She further writes 
that prosecutors have nearly “unre-viewable [sic] discretion to make charging decisions, and can make 
those decisions based on a defendant’s cooperativeness or lack thereof.” Id. 
70. See Lying Prisoners: New Laws Crack Down on Jailhouse Informants, SPECTRUM NEWS 
(Sept. 15, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://spectrumlocalnews.com/tx/san-antonio/news/2019/09/15/lying-priso 
ners--new -laws-crack-down-on-jailhouse-informants [https://perma.cc/8RB6-PGR9]. 












Texas aimed at solving the problem of jailhouse informants once and for 
all.71 
II. NOLLEY V. STATE 
On May 26, 1998, John Nolley was convicted of murder and sentenced 
to life in prison.72 The Texas Second District Court of Appeals affirmed his 
conviction.73 His case would ultimately inspire Texas legislation that many 
view as the “gold standard” against wrongful convictions based on 
unreliable jailhouse informant testimony.74  The facts of the case are as 
follows: 
On Saturday, December 14, 1996, Sharon McLane’s partially nude body 
was found face down in a pool of blood in the kitchen of her apartment.75 
Two knives and a piece of paper containing a partial handprint imprinted in 
blood were found underneath her body.76 A third knife was found near her 
feet.77  A pathologist reported thirty-seven puncture wounds and twenty 
slash wounds on her body.78 Her spinal cord and trachea had been severed.79  
McLane’s neighbors reported hearing the “blood-curdling screams” of 
an adult woman around 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, likely the same day McLane 
had died.80 One neighbor also reported seeing a tall, white man in a black 
cowboy hat walk from the breezeway adjacent to McLane’s apartment about 
thirty minutes later. 81  A maintenance worker also saw the man in the 
cowboy hat and stated that the man looked nervous and suspicious.82 
During the investigation, police linked John Nolley, a twenty-two-year-
old black man, to McLane through voice messages left on her answering 
machine.83 Police discovered that Nolley and his girlfriend had been good 
friends of McLane and that the three had eaten Thanksgiving dinner 
 
71. Nolley v. State, No. 02-98-00253-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 23, 1999), aff’d sub 
nom. Ex parte Nolley, No. WR-46,177-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 2001), vacated sub nom. Ex parte 
Nolley, No. WR-46,177-03, 2018 WL 2126318 (Tex. Crim. App. May 9, 2018). 
72. Maurice Possley, John Nolley, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www 
.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5386 [https://perma.cc/C2B8-CWM 
K] [hereinafter Possley, John Nolley]. 
73. Nolley v. State, No. 02-98-00253-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 23, 1999). 
74. See McCullough & Dehn, supra note 10; Grissom, infra note 111. 





80. Id. Mclane’s “precise time of death was not determined, although the pathologist estimated 
















together a few weeks prior to the incident.84 In an initial interview, Nolley 
told police he had not seen McLane the week that her body was found.85 
However, in a later interview, he admitted that he had seen her that 
Wednesday night.86 He stated that he had brought her beer and marijuana 
and then drank and smoked with her at her apartment.87 He explained that 
he had lied in his initial interview because smoking and selling marijuana 
were violations of his parole. 88  Investigators found a beer bottle in 
McLane’s trash can with Nolley’s fingerprint on it.89  In August 1997, 
Nolley was arrested, charged with murder, and booked into the Tarrant 
County Jail, where he would remain until trial.90 
The prosecution relied on the testimony of jailhouse informant John 
O’Brien, an inmate at Tarrant County Jail. 91  O’Brien testified that in 
October 1997, he was chatting with Nolley in the jail library when Nolley 
confessed that he had killed McLane;92 “[h]e told me that he went to this 
lady’s house with the intentions to rob her and during the robbery, that the 
lady resisted. He claimed there was blood on his shoes and that she put up 
a fight and that’s why he had to kill her.”93  
O’Brien had nine previous felony convictions, numerous parole 
revocations, and was in jail on a charge of theft of farm equipment worth 
over $75,000.94  One month after O’Brien told investigators of Nolley’s 
“confession,” O’Brien was released on parole.95 O’Brien testified that he 
had already entered a plea agreement when he came forward with 
information on Nolley and that the agreement was in no way related to his 
testimony. 96  He further testified that he had never before acted as an 
informant.97 With O’Brien as the star witness for the prosecution, Nolley 
was convicted and sentenced to life.98 
In 2000, two years after his conviction, Nolley reached out to the 






























looked into his case and, in 2008, filed a request for DNA testing, which 
had become much more advanced since the trial.100 In 2015, the Tarrant 
County District Attorney arranged for DNA testing and fingerprint analysis 
and formed a conviction integrity unit to re-investigate the case.101 The test 
results indicated that the blood on one of the knives belonged to a male other 
than Nolley.102 They also revealed that the partial handprint on the piece of 
paper did not belong to Nolley or McLane.103 Shockingly, in reviewing the 
prosecution’s files, the conviction integrity unit discovered a note written 
by the grand jury prosecutor that stated, “How can we indict Nolley if 
bloody palm is not his?”104 The word “not” had been underlined twice.105 
Further investigation revealed records indicating that O’Brien had, in 
fact, been used as an informant in prior cases, including another murder 
case.106 The investigators also discovered documents showing that the trial 
prosecutor had known of O’Brien’s involvement in other cases and that 
O’Brien had received favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony in 
Nolley’s case.107 The Innocence Project used this information in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of Nolley, stating that at trial, the 
prosecutor, “stood mute when O’Brien falsely swore to Mr. Nolley’s jury 
that at no time had he so much as attempted ‘to work any deal’ in exchange 
for serving as a State informant.”108  
Based on all of this evidence, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
vacated Nolley’s conviction in 2018. 109  The judge signed the order 
dismissing the case and turned to face Nolley, stating, “I want to apologize 
for what happened to you. I realize that cannot take back 21 years, but to 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. Investigators had performed DNA tests in the original case on bloodstains, a black 
briefcase, and a bloodstained sock, but DNA technology was rudimentary at the time. Id. The original 








109. Id. Though his sentence was not vacated until 2018, Nolley was released from prison in May 
of 2016. Id. Tarrant County’s conviction integrity unit began looking into Nolley’s case in 2015 after 
DNA tests produced no evidence that Nolley was ever at the scene of the crime. Id. This unit discovered 
that O’Brien had testified in another murder trial and had received a reduced sentence after testifying in 
Nolley’s case. Id. Upon learning of the suppression of this evidence in May of 2016, the district court 













the extent that words can express our sorrow, I apologize for what 
happened.”110 
The facts of Nolley’s case, from the prosecutorial misconduct to the 
nineteen years an innocent man spent in prison, exemplify the problems 
surrounding the use of jailhouse informants.  
III. THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE’S ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
John Nolley’s case inspired legislative change in Texas aimed at tracking 
and regulating the use of jailhouse informants. 111  About a month after 
Nolley’s release from prison, the chief of Tarrant County’s conviction 
integrity unit created a database that would allow prosecutors to document 
their use of jailhouse informants, including any benefit the informant 
received, and share this information with other prosecutors in the county in 
order to alert them of the possibility that a particular inmate is providing 
false information in exchange for benefits in multiple cases. 112  This 
database became the central feature of a larger policy enacted by the Tarrant 
County District Attorney’s Office to regulate the use of jailhouse 
informants.113 
The steps taken by Tarrant County’s conviction integrity unit served as 
a blueprint for a Texas state commission charged with recommending new 
laws to prevent wrongful convictions. 114  The commission’s 
 
110. Id. “Today marks the end of an incredibly painful journey for John Nolley, who wrongly 
served 19 years for a murder he didn’t commit,” said Nina Morrison, staff attorney for the Innocence 
Project. Press Release, Innocence Project, Tarrant County District Attorney Dismisses Murder Charges 
Against John Nolley Based on Actual Innocence, Ending His 21 Year Quest for Justice (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/tarrant-county-district-attorney-dismisses-murder-charges-against-j 
ohn-nolley/. Morrison commended Tarrant County’s conviction integrity unit for “put[ting] hundreds of 
hours into a joint effort to reinvestigate this case and seek the truth.” Id. Since his release from prison, 
Nolley has gotten married and opened up his own business. Id. 
111. Brandi Grissom, Snitch Testimony Sent Innocent Man to Prison for 18 Years. Texas 
Lawmakers Hope He's the Last, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Sept. 20, 2017, 12:09 PM), https://www.dalla 
snews.com/news/politics/2017/09/20/snitch-testimony-sent-innocent-man-to-prison-for-18-years-texas 
-lawmaker s-hope-he-s-the-last/ [https://perma.cc/2E4H-3MQ7]. 
112. Id. The chief explained that “there was no process in place at the time of Nolley’s trial to 
alert prosecutors to jailhouse snitches who had testified in other cases. Because O’Brien’s deals were 
made with others in the prosecutor’s office, attorneys in Nolley’s case were unaware of the inmate’s 
tattling proclivity.” Id. 
113. Texas Prosecutors Rethink the Use of Incentivized Witnesses in Light of Innocence Project 
Case, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-case-
changes-policy-regarding-incentivized-witnesses/ [https://perma.cc/YBQ5-3V92]. 
114. See Grissom, supra note 111. The commission, known as the Timothy Cole Exoneration 
Review Commission, was formed in the name of a twenty-six-year-old Texas Tech student who was 
wrongfully convicted and died before DNA evidence led to his exoneration. Id. 












recommendations were carried out through House Bill 34,115 which went 
into effect on September 1, 2017, amending the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure.116 The provisions of the Bill that relate to the use of informants 
are summarized as follows: First, prosecutors shall track the use of jailhouse 
informant testimony, regardless of whether the testimony is presented at 
trial, as well as any benefits offered in exchange for the testimony. 117 
Second, evidence of prior offenses committed by a jailhouse informant may 
be admitted for the purpose of impeachment, regardless of whether the 
informant was actually convicted of the offense, if the informant received a 
benefit with respect to the offense. 118  Stated differently, not only are 
previous charges that resulted in convictions admissible for impeachment, 
but previous charges that were dismissed in exchange for informant 
testimony are also admissible.119  Finally, if the state intends to use the 
testimony of a jailhouse informant at trial, the state must disclose to the 
defendant any information that is relevant to the informant’s credibility, 
including: (1) the informant’s criminal history, including charges that were 
dismissed; (2) any grant or offer of immunity, sentencing reduction, 
leniency, or special treatment from the state in exchange for the informant’s 
testimony; and (3) information concerning other criminal cases in which the 
informant has testified as a jailhouse informant.120 
 
115. TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH, TIMOTHY COLE EXONERATION REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT 16 
(2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1436589/tcerc-final-report-december-9-2016.pdf. [https://per 
ma.cc/7M5B-6TQP]; H.B. 34, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).  
116. H.B. 34; Grissom, supra note 115.  
117. H.B. 34. The Bill provides, in relevant part:  
An attorney representing the state shall track: (1) the use of testimony of a person to whom a 
defendant made a statement against the defendant’s interest while the person was imprisoned 
or confined in the same correctional facility as the defendant, if known by the attorney 
representing the state, regardless of whether the testimony is presented at trial; and (2) any 
benefits offered or provided to a person in exchange for testimony described by Subdivision 
(1). 
Id. 
118. Id. The Bill provides, in relevant part, that, “[e]vidence of a prior offense committed by a 
person who gives testimony . . . may be admitted for the purpose of impeachment if the person received 
a benefit . . . with respect to the offense, regardless of whether the person was convicted of the offense.” 
Id. 
119. Id. 
120. The Bill provides, in relevant part: 
[I]f the state intends to use at a defendant’s trial testimony of a person to whom the defendant 
made a statement against the defendant’s interest while the person was imprisoned or confined 
in the same correctional facility as the defendant, the state shall disclose to the defendant any 
information in the possession, custody, or control of the state that is relevant to the person’s 
credibility, including: (1) the person’s complete criminal history, including any charges that 
were dismissed or reduced as part of a plea bargain; (2) any grant, promise, or offer of immunity 
from prosecution, reduction of sentence, or other leniency or special treatment, given by the 














This law has received national recognition. Criminal justice advocates 
have lauded it as “the strongest anti-snitch measure in the nation” 121 and 
“the gold standard for jailhouse informant laws.”122 Alexandra Natapoff, 
leading scholar on jailhouse informants, stated, “[t]his legislation is an 
important step in pulling back the curtain of secrecy and unreliability that 
has long surrounded the use of criminal informants. It will help reduce 
wrongful convictions, and it will strengthen the integrity of the Texas 
criminal process. Other states should take careful note.”123  
A. A Closer Analysis of Texas House Bill 34 
Texas House Bill 34 appears to be a significant step toward reigning in 
unreliable jailhouse informant testimony and, thereby, reducing the number 
of wrongful convictions in Texas. The first provision requiring prosecutors 
to document their use of jailhouse informants should provide attorneys with 
the information necessary to rule out testimony from repeat jailhouse 
informants, the most unreliable class of jailhouse informants. The second 
and third provisions should ensure that this information is disclosed at trial, 
where the jury can use it to detect untrustworthy informants. All three 
provisions seem to work together to ensure that information that bears upon 
the reliability of a jailhouse informant is recorded and disclosed at trial, 
giving the Bill the appearance of a comprehensive solution to the jailhouse 
informant problem. However, while the law is certainly a step in the right 
 
cases in which the person has testified, or offered to testify, against a defendant with whom the 
person was imprisoned or confined, including any grant, promise, or offer as described by 
Subdivision (2) given by the state in exchange for the testimony. 
Id. The Bill also includes safeguards regarding interrogations and eyewitness identification. Id. More 
specifically, it requires that custodial interrogations of suspects facing serious charges be electronically 
recorded unless good cause exists. Id. It further provides that the Texas Commission on Law 
Enforcement shall establish a training program on eyewitness identification and each law enforcement 
agency shall require their peace officers to complete the training. Id. 
121. See Grissom, supra note 111.  
122. Marc Levin, Levin: More Criminal Justice Reform for Texas in 2018, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 
16, 2018, 12:10 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Levin-More-criminal 
-justice-reform-for-Texas-in-12499603.php [https://perma.cc/QRU8-PD4S]. Innocence Project 
legislative strategist Michelle Feldman said, “Texas at this point is the gold standard in innocence 
reform. There’s always more to be done . . . but I think this law is putting Texas really as a leader.” 
McCullough & Dehn, supra note 10. Feldman further stated, “It’s going to shed light on this secretive 
system that leads to so many wrongful convictions, and we really hope it’ll be a model for other states 
in the country to follow.” Id. 
123. Texas Governor Signs Landmark Comprehensive Legislation to Prevent Wrongful 
Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/texasgovernorsignslandmarkbill/ 
[https://perma.cc/P8CM-FUDK]. Michael Morton, who was wrongfully convicted of the murder of his 
wife and spent twenty-five years in prison, stated, “Thank you, Governor Abbot, for signing HB34 into 
law.” Id. 












direction, a closer analysis reveals that the Bill is far from a complete 
solution.  
A hypothetical application of Texas’s law to Nolley reveals its practical 
limitations. The first provision discussed above would have required all 
prosecutors to document their use of O’Brien as an informant and therefore 
would have provided the prosecutor who tried Nolley’s case with the 
knowledge that O’Brien had been used as an informant in other criminal 
proceedings. However, the investigation following the trial revealed that the 
prosecutor already had this knowledge.124 Thus, the first provision would 
not have given the prosecutor information on O’Brien that he did not already 
possess. The second provision allows certain evidence to be admitted for 
the purposes of impeachment and does not require anything of the 
prosecutor. The third provision, on the other hand, requires that the state 
disclose to the defendant any information that is relevant to the informant’s 
credibility; however, this obligation is already encompassed by the Brady 
requirement, which compels the state to turn over materially impeaching 
evidence. Given that the prosecutor in Nolley was aware of O’Brien’s prior 
work as an informant and, despite a constitutional obligation to disclose that 
information,125 “stood mute when O’Brien falsely swore to Mr. Nolley’s 
jury that no time had he so much as attempted to ‘work any deal’ in 
exchange for serving as a State informant,” it is unlikely that a similar 
obligation rooted in state law would have motivated the prosecutor to take 
a different course of action.126 Considering these facts, even if House Bill 
34 had been in effect at the time Nolley was tried for murder, it likely would 
not have changed the outcome of the case. The law ultimately depends on 
prosecutors—who face immense pressure to secure convictions and stand 
to gain from informant testimony regardless of its reliability—to regulate 
jailhouse informants and lacks the oversight and teeth necessary to ensure 
that unreliable informant testimony is detected and excluded from the 
criminal justice system. 
Moreover, while the Bill requires prosecutors to document informant 
use,127 it does not establish or even require a database, such as the one in 
Tarrant County, through which information on jailhouse informants can be 
 
124. Possley, John Nolley, supra note 72. 
125. Courts have held that that the suppression of evidence concerning a witness’s prior work as 
an informant constitutes a Brady violation if prejudice ensues from that suppression. See, e.g., United 
States v. Lopez-Rivas, 614 F. App’x 918, 919–20 (9th Cir. 2015) (implying that a Brady violation would 
have occurred if the government had suppressed information about a witness’s prior work as an 
informant and prejudice had ensued); People v. Wright, 658 N.E.2d 1009, 1011–12 (N.Y. 1995) (holding 
that a witness’s prior history as a police informant constituted Brady material). 
126. Possley, John Nolley, supra note 72. 













shared. Thus, while a prosecutor may have documented his or her use of a 
particular informant, that information may be stored away in a desk drawer 
in a rural part of South Texas, unavailable to a prosecutor in North Texas 
who later uses the same informant. In fact, that information would likely be 
unavailable to a prosecutor even within the same region of Texas. Shannon 
Edmonds, the staff attorney and director of governmental relations for the 
Texas Association of County and District Attorneys, stated that “it could be 
a challenge for prosecutors in small counties to implement the policy 
because lawmakers provided no funding to help counties create systems like 
the one Tarrant County has established.”128 Edmonds further stated that 
“[i]ndividual prosecutors’ offices will have to build something from the 
ground up, and in most places it will probably be kept in filing cabinets or 
binders or something like that.”129 
With all of that being said, the provisions of the Bill might help to 
discourage prosecutorial misconduct. The requirement that prosecutors 
track informant testimony will, in many counties, bring the use of 
informants under the supervision of other attorneys, thereby increasing the 
oversight and accountability of prosecutors.130 For example, the prosecutor 
in Nolley may have disclosed O’Brien’s history as an informant if he had 
known that that information, as well as his own use of O’Brien as an 
informant, would be available to other prosecutors. Furthermore, while 
constitutional requirements overlap with the disclosure requirements in the 
Bill, the incorporation of these requirements into the Texas Code of 
Criminal Procedure places them more directly in the line of sight of Texas 
judges and prosecutors, where they are more likely to influence 
prosecutorial action. Nonetheless, House Bill 34 leaves the responsibility of 
recording and disclosing informant information to the prosecution and, 
thereby, leaves open the possibility that prosecutors will suppress this 
information, as was the case in Nolley. 
IV. A NEEDED SOLUTION THAT WOULD ENABLE JUSTICE 
Additional solutions are needed to prevent the use of false jailhouse 
informant testimony. The Brady disclosure requirements discussed above 
lack the teeth necessary to safeguard against false informant testimony, and 
House Bill 34 does nothing to prevent the prosecution from suppressing 
 
128. Grissom, supra note 111. 
129. Grissom, supra note 111. 
130. This will not be the case in counties where records on informant use are kept in the 
prosecutor’s desk drawer. 












impeaching information about an informant. 131  Both problematically 
depend on the prosecution to function properly and thereby result in the 
detection of unreliable informant testimony. One practical solution that 
would close the door on prosecutorial misconduct would be to impose upon 
judges a “gatekeeper” function in determining the admissibility of all 
informant testimony. This solution was explored in Dodd v. State, an 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals case.132 In the original Dodd opinion, 
the court held that before a jailhouse informant can testify, the judge must 
hold a “reliability hearing” to filter out informant testimony that is likely to 
be false.133 At these hearings, the prosecution must disclose any benefits 
ever offered to the informant, the informant’s complete criminal history, the 
statements made by the defendant about which the informant agrees to 
testify, and any other cases in which the informant has cooperated with the 
prosecution.134 According to scholar Jack Call, “[n]o court in United States 
history had ever gone so far to protect against the danger of perjury 
presented by testimony from jailhouse informants.” 135  Despite the 
feasibility of this solution, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals later 
 
131. As discussed earlier, the Brady rule requires only that materially impeaching evidence be 
turned over to the other side. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Evidence is considered 
“material” only when there is “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–
34 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “In the context of jailhouse 
informant testimony, this definition of materiality does not provide enough incentive to ensure that 
prosecutors will provide defendants the information required . . . .” Call, supra note 40, at 81. It is far 
too likely that appellate courts will “decide that, even if the defense had used the evidence withheld by 
the prosecution to impeach the testimony of the jailhouse informant, there is not a ‘reasonable 
probability’ that the defendant would have been found not guilty.” Id.  
132. Dodd v. State, No. F-97-26, 1999 WL 521976 (Okla. Crim. App. July 22, 1999), reh’g 
granted, opinion vacated and withdrawn, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
133. Id. Cf. Steven Clark, Procedural Reforms in Capital Cases Applied to Perjury, 34 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 453, 460 (2001) (noting that the Illinois House of Representatives Special 
Committee on Prosecutorial Misconduct recommended that the Illinois legislature mandate reliability 
hearings in all cases where jailhouse informant testimony is to be used). 
134. Call, supra note 40, at 79. See also Emily Jane Dodds, I’ll Make You a Deal: How Repeat 
Informants Are Corrupting the Criminal Justice System and What to Do About It, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1063, 1079 (2008) (“At these hearings, the court would weigh factors bearing on an informant’s 
credibility, including cooperation or benefits received in other cases, and would determine whether the 
informant was reliable enough to testify.”). See, e.g., George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law 
and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2000) (noting that a jailhouse informant’s 
“history of repeated cooperation for compensation” should “create a presumption of insufficient 
reliability”). 













vacated the opinion and issued a new decision that excluded the original 
opinion’s mandate of a reliability hearing.136 
Legislatures should build on the solution set forth in Dodd by not only 
imposing upon judges a “gatekeeper” function with regard to jailhouse 
informant testimony but also by ensuring that judges have the information 
necessary to thoroughly assess an informant’s reliability without having to 
depend on the prosecution for that information. This could ultimately be 
done by providing trial judges, in addition to defense attorneys and 
prosecutors, with access to a statewide database similar to the one developed 
in Tarrant County. This database would provide judges with information 
that is vital to a reliability assessment, such as a jailhouse informant’s 
cooperation in other cases and the benefits the informant was offered or 
received. 137  Legislation should further require that judges, rather than 
prosecutors, document informant use in order to ensure the objectivity of 
the data and informant tracking system.138 While it would impose a financial 
burden on taxpayers to develop such a database, it (1) would be much more 
feasible to pool state resources to create a single statewide database rather 
than requiring each county to develop its own independent database and (2) 
 
136. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). In her concurring opinion, Judge 
Strubhar persuasively called for the reliability hearing mandate prescribed in the original opinion, 
writing: 
This case illustrates the problems associated with the use of jailhouse informants who often 
play a pivotal role in an accused's conviction. While I recognize the need to use jailhouse 
informants' testimony, we must take certain precautions to ensure a citizen is not convicted on 
the testimony of an unreliable professional jailhouse informant, or snitch, who routinely trades 
dubious information for favors. The use of such untrustworthy witnesses carries considerable 
costs, especially in death-penalty cases, by undermining the foundation of cases where the 
stakes are the highest. The misuse of such informants also adds financial costs to taxpayers 
when convictions based on their testimony are reversed to be retried. Therefore, to ensure the 
utmost reliability in the admission of jailhouse informant testimony, I would also mandate the 
reliability hearing prescribed in the original opinion in this matter. As with the use of Daubert 
hearings to ensure the relevance and reliability of novel scientific expert testimony, this 
reliability hearing will allow the trial court to perform its gatekeeping function and filter out 
prejudicial jailhouse informant testimony that is more probably false than true.  
Id. at 785 (Strubhar, P.J., concurring) (citation omitted). In another concurring opinion, Judge Craig 
countered Judge Strubhar’s argument, writing, “[A]dequate protection is afforded by the discovery 
procedure and the use of cautionary jury instructions as mandated in the majority opinion. Many 
witnesses, in addition to jailhouse informants, may have a motive to lie. That is not a sufficient reason 
to remove the trier of fact from making a determination of the credibility of such witness.” Id. at 787 
(Craig, M.C., concurring). Based on the great number of exonerations that have recently been traced 
back to jailhouse informants, Judge Craig was clearly mistaken in his belief that adequate protection 
against false jailhouse informant testimony is afforded by discovery and jury instructions alone. 
137. In Nolley’s case, this database would have shown that O’Brien had previously testified in a 
murder trial in exchange for a reduced sentence. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
138.  Legislatures should require that judges, or judicial clerks, record the name and testimony of 
every jailhouse informant that testifies at trial. They should further require that judges, or judicial clerks, 
monitor the database and ensure that prosecutors input or provide information that only they would have, 
such as the benefits offered to a given informant.  












is at least as practical as other solutions that have been proposed, such as 
requiring the electronic recording of jailhouse informants.139  Moreover, 
preventing wrongful convictions should be a top priority when it comes to 
allocating taxpayers’ dollars. Beyond this critical public policy rationale, it 
is incredibly costly in the long run for a state to wrongfully convict an 
individual. In the past quarter century, Texas taxpayers have paid nearly 
$100 million to wrongfully convicted individuals.140 Implementing such a 
database would be much less expensive than the ultimate cost of wrongfully 
convicting individuals based on unreliable jailhouse informant testimony.141 
Another counterargument to this solution is that requiring judges to serve as 
gatekeepers with regard to jailhouse informant testimony would impose too 
large a burden on judges. While it is true that this solution would create 
additional work for judges, it would almost eliminate the possibility that 
prosecutors would suppress impeaching information about jailhouse 
informants,142 and the first Canon of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges 
is that judges must do whatever is necessary to uphold the integrity of the 
judiciary.143  
 
139. See NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, 
at 15. In Massiah v. United States, the Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, the 
government cannot “deliberately elicit” information from a suspect that has been formally charged with 
a crime in the absence of counsel. 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964). To satisfy Massiah, a jailhouse 
informant must obtain information “passively” and, therefore, cannot be placed in a particular inmate’s 
cell for the purpose of obtaining evidence. Call, supra note 40, at 75. Thus, to comply with a law 
requiring that confessions made to jailhouse informants be recorded, informants could not be temporarily 
wired and placed in a cell to immediately elicit information from an inmate, but, rather, would have to 
wear a recorder for long periods of time (until the suspect happens to make a confession). Jailhouse 
informants would be unlikely to agree to such extended surveillance, and it would be burdensome for 
prosecutors to operate recorders for long periods of time. See Brian Frazier, Best Hidden Voice 
Recorders of 2020 Review, SPYCENTRE SECURITY (Jan. 1, 2020), https://spycentre.com/blogs/news/top-
5-hidden-voice-recorders-of-2017-review [https://perma.cc/K5UJ-FFS6] (explaining that top-of-the-
line hidden recording device must be recharged for two hours every ten hours it is in use).  
140. Scott Rodd, What Do States Owe People Who Are Wrongfully Convicted?, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR. (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2 
017/03/14/what-do-states-owe-people-who-are-wrongfully-convicted [https://perma.cc/KU4J-Y9KA]. 
141. See How Much Does a Database Design Service Cost?, COSTOWL, https://www.costowl.co 
m/b2b/design-services-database-cost.html [https://perma.cc/DZB3-SNT8] (“Small businesses can 
expect to spend anywhere from $2,000 to $10,000 for database design, while larger companies might 
spend anywhere from $10,000 to half a million dollars.”). 
142. Given that the suppression of impeaching information by prosecutors is a recurring theme in 
cases involving wrongful convictions based on false informant testimony, judges must shoulder this 
burden in order to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Possley, John Nolley, 
supra note 72 (explaining that prosecutor in Nolley v. State suppressed information regarding jailhouse 
informant’s participation in other cases, as well as the plea deal informant received for testifying). 
143. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 2 
(2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effecti 
ve_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/76ZJ-SPMR]. The commentary to Canon 1 states that 














This solution would ultimately build upon House Bill 34’s data-
gathering requirements and the Dodd court’s judicial gatekeeping scheme, 
while filling the major hole in both by eliminating the dependency on the 
prosecution to gather and come forward with information on informants.144 
Moreover, by requiring a statewide database, legislatures would address the 
issue of compartmentalizing information between the 254 different counties 
in Texas, which is one of the greatest limitations on the potential efficacy 
House Bill 34.145 
Alternatively, if legislatures do not want to saddle judges with such a big 
responsibility, they could provide prosecutors and defense attorneys with 
access to the statewide database, require that both sides record any use of a 
jailhouse informant in any case (to ensure that recording is accomplished), 
and then rely on the disclosure requirements in Brady and state law.146 This 
would ensure that information on informant use is documented and that both 
sides have access to that information, thereby greatly reducing the ability of 
prosecutors to suppress impeaching information. That being said, this 
alternative would take the recording and disclosure process outside of the 
purview of judges, making it less likely that prosecutors would comply,147 
and would leave the door open for prosecutors to hide certain information 
that only they would have, such as the benefits offered to an informant in 
exchange for testimony. Given that the stakes are so high in capital cases,148 
legislatures could cut a balance between these two versions of the database 
solution and require judges to serve a gatekeeper role only in capital cases, 
leaving database recording and disclosure to prosecutors and defense 
attorneys in all other cases. 
Some scholars have argued against any and all use of the reliability 
hearings proposed in Dodd, pointing out that they increase the burden and 
 
this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and injures our system of government under 
law.” Id. at 3. On a related note, the American Judges Association points out that “[work] volume of 
courts is a management challenge for judges, not an excuse for deemphasizing procedural fairness.” 
KEVIN BURKE & STEVE LEBEN, AM. JUDGES ASS’N, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY INGREDIENT IN 
PUBLIC SATISFACTION 17 (2007), http://www.amjudges.org/pdfs/AJAWhitePaper9-26-07.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/A6R7-BWQ7]. 
144. The Dodd solution relied on prosecutors to produce information regarding informants at 
reliability hearings, while House Bill 34 relied on prosecutors to track and document informant use. Both 
solutions faultily depended on the prosecution to function properly and left the door open to prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
145. See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.  
146. If there are no disclosure requirements in state law, such as those in H.B. 34, legislatures 
could introduce them. See, e.g., H.B. 34, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). 
147. In theory, a prosecutor would be more likely to record or produce information requested by 
a judge than required by state law, because, without the judge looking over his or her shoulder, the only 
person likely to detect the suppression of information would be the defense attorney—the very person 
from whom the information is being suppressed. 
148. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 












expense of criminal trials.149 One critic writes that “[c]alling the informant 
to testify [at a reliability hearing], subjecting him to direct- and cross-
examination, calling and examining other character witnesses, and 
presenting evidence bearing on the informant’s credibility would 
significantly encumber courts.”150 She goes on to state that “[t]he strain that 
reliability hearings would impose on the court is obvious when considering 
the sheer scope of information supporters suggest should be presented.”151 
Another critic suggests that reliability hearings could stall proceedings to 
such an extent as to deprive criminal defendants of their Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial.152 Though the solution proposed above builds on the 
Dodd court’s notion of imposing upon judges a “gatekeeper role,” it would 
not necessarily require a reliability hearing as was recommended by the 
original Dodd court. By (1) creating a statewide database containing details 
about every jailhouse informant ever used and (2) providing judges, 
criminal defense attorneys, and prosecutors with access to that database 
before trial, there would be less need for a reliability hearing to determine 
the credibility of a given jailhouse informant.153 In reviewing the database, 
judges and defense attorneys would already have the information they need 
on a given informant prior to trial.154 Such a solution would maximize the 
utilization of modern-day technology and in turn maximize judicial 
efficiency.155 Moreover, even if a reliability hearing was mandatory, the 
entire hearing would be streamlined because the database would give the 
judge access to much of the information that would otherwise need to be 
presented by the parties. This would avoid the problems critics point to 
concerning the burden of reliability hearings and their potential to infringe 
on criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.156 
 
149. Dodds, supra note 134, at 1080 (“[R]eliability hearings would undoubtedly increase the 
burden and expense of the criminal trial, particularly if the hearings were fully adversarial.”). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 1080 n.100. Dodds notes that the “sheer scope of information that supporters suggest 
should be presented” would include “the informant’s criminal history, any inducement for the 
informant’s testimony, the testimony expected, the circumstances of the alleged incriminating statement 
to the informant, whether the informant has ever recanted the testimony, and other cases in which the 
informant has testified.” Id. 
152. Clark, supra note 133, at 461. See also Dodds, supra note 134, at 1080. 
153. Legislatures should give prosecutors limited access to the databases and require them to input 
information that would not otherwise be available to the judge, such as the testimony that the jailhouse 
informant will offer, the circumstances in which the alleged incriminating statement was made, and 
whether the informant has ever recanted his or her testimony. 
154.  Prosecutors could electronically input this information from the comfort of their homes. 
There would be no need to convene for a hearing. 
155.  This solution is also more economically feasible than House Bill 34, which requires all 
counties to develop their own databases or systems to track informant use. With a statewide database, 
only one database would need to be created and maintained. 













In addition to the database solution, state legislatures and courts could 
mandate special jury instructions any time jailhouse informant testimony is 
presented at trial.157 Though this is more of an ancillary solution, it would 
ensure that jurors are put on notice that judicial informant testimony 
deserves extra scrutiny and would call to their attention the special 
considerations that must be taken into account when assessing the 
credibility of an informant, such as: (1) any other case in which the 
informant testified or offered statements against a defendant; (2) whether 
the witness has ever received any pay, leniency in prosecution, immunity, 
or other benefit in exchange for testimony; (3) whether the informant’s 
testimony has ever changed; and (4) the informant’s criminal history.158 
Such instructions would provide an additional safety net underneath the 
database solution, increasing the likelihood that the jury will detect any 
unreliable jailhouse informant testimony that makes it past the judge. 
Notably, the Dodd court’s second opinion included the mandate of special 
jury instructions set forth in the original opinion.159 
CONCLUSION 
The use of informant testimony in trial proceedings poses a serious threat 
to the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system. Texas’s House 
Bill 34 represents a significant step toward addressing this issue. However, 
an application of the law to Nolley reveals its practical shortcomings and 
demonstrates the need for further regulatory measures. The solution 
proposed herein addresses these shortcomings, utilizing modern-day 
 
157. Scholar Jack Call acknowledged this as a possible solution, writing that “[t]his could be a 
rather neutral instruction, which would simply remind jurors that the jailhouse informant had received a 
benefit from the state in return for his testimony . . . . Or the instruction could be a little stronger, directing 
jurors to be more skeptical about the credibility of the jailhouse informant’s testimony . . . .” Call, supra 
note 40, at 80. 
158. See Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
159. The Dodd court stated that in all cases where a court admits informant testimony, the 
following instructions must be given:  
The testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant must be examined 
and weighed by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the 
informer’s testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is for you 
to determine. In making that determination, you should consider: (1) whether the witness has 
received anything (including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, 
personal advantage, or vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the 
informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether 
the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any deal, promise, 
inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; (3) whether the informant 
has ever changed his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history of the informant; and (5) any 
other evidence relevant to the informer’s credibility. 
Id. 












technology to address the age-old problem of unreliable jailhouse informant 
testimony. By requiring judges to serve as the “gatekeepers” of jailhouse 
informant testimony and providing them with access to a statewide database 
that contains information critical to their assessment, legislatures can ensure 
that unreliable informants are detected before their testimony even makes it 
before the jury. As an additional safety net, legislatures should mandate 
special jury instructions that inform the jury of the special considerations 
that must be taken into account when assessing the credibility of a jailhouse 
informant. It is possible that this database-centered solution would 
occasionally result in the exclusion of reliable jailhouse informant 
testimony, but a fundamental, time-honored principle of the U.S. criminal 
justice system is that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that 
one innocent suffer.”160 
Luke G. Allen 
 
160. Blackstone’s Ratio: Is It More Important to Protect Innocence or Punish Guilt?, CATO INST., 
https://www.cato.org/policing-in-america/chapter-4/blackstones-ratio [https:// perma.cc/J7PE-MQLF]. 
See also Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 619, 628 (2007) (“[O]ur criminal justice system operates on the precautionary principle that ‘better 
that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.’ When false testimony is introduced into 
evidence . . . the justice system is derailed.”). 
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